This paper investigates whether the valuation effect of corporate governance depends on the degree of competition in the companies' product markets in a large international sample covering 14 countries from the European Union (EU). Besides providing an out-of-sample test of previous U.S.-centered studies, the study uses more comprehensive and reliable measures of both product market competition and corporate governance. Consistent with the hypothesis that product market competition acts as a substitute for corporate governance as competitive pressure enforces discipline on managers to maximize firm value, our results show that corporate governance significantly increases firm value in non-competitive industries only. This result is robust to a large number of robustness checks including the use of alternative measures of competition and governance, a sample extension including six large non-EU countries, as well as using alternative regressions specifications.
Introduction
This paper investigates the relation between product market competition, corporate governance, and firm value in a large international sample covering 14 countries from the European Union (EU). Besides providing an out-of-sample test of previous studies focusing on U.S. firms, this study uses more comprehensive and reliable measures of both product market competition and corporate governance.
A large body of literature documents that good corporate governance leads to higher firm valuations by mitigating the conflicts of interest between managers and shareholders (e.g., Yermack, 1996 , Gompers et al., 2003 , Cremers and Nair, 2005 , Core et al., 2006 , Chhaochharia and Grinstein, 2007 , or Bebchuck et al., 2009 . A number of recent studies, however, raise the question whether all firms benefit similarly from good corporate governance. In fact, product market competition may act as a substitute for corporate governance as competitive pressure enforces discipline on managers to maximize firm value. Consequently, corporate governance may matter more in less competitive industries than in more competitive industries.
Some recent studies provide empirical support for this hypothesis. Most importantly, Giroud and Mueller (2008, "GM") find the strength of the relation between long-term stock returns, firm value, as well as operating performance and corporate governance to increase monotonically in the degree of product market competition. In the most competitive industries there is no significant relation between corporate governance and the three alternative measures of company performance. In contrast, this relation is strong, positive, and significant in non-competitive industries. This finding is corroborated in Giroud and Mueller (2009) who show that firms in non-competitive industries experience a significant drop in operating performance after the passage of business combination laws while the operating performance of firms in competitive industries remains largely unaffected. By reducing the threat of hostile takeovers, business combination laws weaken corporate governance and increase the opportunity for managerial slack. Hence, competition in the product market seems to act as a substitute for a poor corporate governance and pressure managers towards a maximization of firm value independent of a deterioration in the firms' corporate governance. Chhaochharia et al. (2009) find supporting evidence by investigating the effect of the Sarbanes Oxley law on firm efficiency. They find that firms in less competitive industries experienced significantly larger increases in efficiency upon introduction of Sarbanes Oxley than firms in more competitive industries. They also find that firms in less competitive industries were more likely to be associated with financial restatements, insider trading, and backdating during that period than firms in more competitive industries. All these findings suggest that competition on a firm's product market is associated with a reduction of agency problems. Consistent with this finding, Cremers et al. (2008) show that firms in more competitive industries have more takeover defenses. They argue that competition is a substitute for the market of corporate control with more information available in competitive markets making monitoring less costly. In contrast, Kadyrzhanova and Rhodes-Kropf (2007) find anti-takeover provisions to have a positive valuation effect in concentrated (non-competitive) industries and a strong negative effect in competitive industries. Moreover, in a hand-collected sample of 888 takeover contests for exchange-listed U.S. target firms in the manufacturing industry over the time period from 1990 to 2005, they find firms in less competitive industries to be more likely to adopt antitakeover provisions. In addition, anti-takeover provisions lead to higher takeover premiums in non-competitive industries only. 1 Hence, the existing U.S. evidence on whether the valuation effect of corporate governance depends on the degree of competition in a company's product market is inconclusive and 1 A related literature investigates the relationship between product market competition and managerial incentive schemes. Cuñat and Guadalupe (2005) and Baggs and De Bettignies (2007) both find that a higher level of product market competition increases the performance pay sensitivity of compensation schemes in U.K. and Canadian firms, respectively. Beiner et al. (2010) account for a possible non-linearity in this relationship and find that managerial incentive schemes are a convex function of product market competition in a sample of Swiss firms.
evidence from other countries may provide important "out-of-sample" evidence. Moreover, all studies concentrating on U.S. firms are plagued by similar problems in the measurement of corporate governance and competition. First, corporate governance is measured by GIM's index. This index exclusively contains anti-takeover provisions, which are only one dimension of corporate governance. Board characteristics (e.g., Yermack, 1996; Faleye, 2007) , CEO ownership and power (e.g. Habib and Ljungqvist, 2005; Adams et al., 2005) and other aspects of corporate governance are neglected. Second, all these studies either measure competition using a Herfindahl-Hirschman index (HHI), which is based on all firms in the Compustat universe (e.g., Mueller, 2008, 2009; Cremers et al., 2008) , or a HHI from the U.S.
Economic Census, which is calculated alternatively for the largest 50 and the largest four companies within each industry (e.g., Cremers et al., 2008) , as a measure of product market competition. Ali et al. (2009) , however, argue that competition measures calculated exclusively with Compustat data, and thereby only covering the public firms within an industry, are poor proxies for actual competition. In fact, the correlation between the Compustat-based competition measures and those obtained from the U.S. Census, which are based on the 50 largest firms within an industry regardless of whether they are listed or unlisted, is only 13 percent. However, even this HHI from the U.S. Census is affected with a number of problems.
First, it only covers manufacturing firms. Given the increasing importance of other industries for the U.S. economy (and developed countries' economies worldwide), we believe that it is important to include non-manufacturing industries in the analysis. Moreover, the HHIs from the U.S. Census are updated only once in five years. Product market competition, however, is likely to change faster than in five-year intervals, in particular for young and growing industries.
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In this study, we investigate the relation between product market competition, corporate governance, and firm value in a large international sample covering 14 EU countries. We thereby use more comprehensive and reliable measures of product market competition and corporate governance than used in previous U.S.-based research. We measure competition based on a HHI over all listed firms contained in Thomson Financial's Worldscope database and all non-listed firms contained in Bureau van Dijk's Amadeus database, which provides extensive coverage of non-listed firms throughout Europe. This HHI improves upon that from the U.S. Census in that it can be calculated for each year, covers all industries, and is not restricted to the 50 largest companies within each industry. Moreover, we combine the product markets of all 14 EU countries to account for the fact that the markets in these countries are strongly interrelated and exports / imports to and from other EU countries make up for a large part of the respective product markets.
Our measure of corporate governance is based on 64 different governance attributes obtained from Governance Metrics International (GMI). GMI classifies these 64 attributes into six categories, namely board accountability, financial disclosure and internal control, shareholder rights, remuneration, market for control, and corporate behavior. To condense the information contained in these 64 attributes, we follow prior literature and construct an additive corporate governance index (e.g., GIM; Aggarwal et al., 2009) . Specifically, we first code a value of one to each governance attribute that a firm has in place and zero otherwise and then calculate the percentage of attributes a company has adopted (i.e., attributes which have been assigned a value of one). In a robustness check, we use an alternative version of this index that excludes attributes that are in place at more than 90 or less than 10 percent of the sample firms. We thereby attempt to account for the fact that certain governance attributes are adopted by a very large percentage of sample firms and other attributes by almost none. These corporate governance attributes naturally will have a very low variance and potentially weaken the effect of our corporate governance indices.
We use a number of alternative approaches to investigate whether the valuation effect of corporate governance depends on the competitiveness of its product markets. First, we follow GM and investigate whether the effect of corporate governance on firm value is different across the three terciles of the empirical distribution of HHI, our measure for product market competition. Consistent with GM, we find the effect of corporate governance to be significant only in the highest tercile of the HHI distribution. Hence, consistent with the hypothesis that product market competition acts as a substitute for corporate governance, corporate governance significantly increases firm value in non-competitive industries only. We check the robustness of this result by using the median, quartiles, or quintiles to classify our sample observations into more and less competitive firm-years. We also construct the HHIs based on the companies' total assets instead of sales, use the yearly distribution of the HHIs, instead of pooling all observations, to classify firm-years into competitive and non-competitive, use only the listed companies covered by Worldscope to construct the HHIs, and extend our sample to include six non-EU countries, roughly doubling sample size, and find the results to remain qualitatively unchanged. We also use the approach of Kadyrzhanova and Rhodes-Kropf (2007) and include an interaction term between corporate governance and competition in our Q-regressions or estimate regressions of Tobin's Q on the corporate governance index and control variables for sub-samples of firms in competitive and non-competitive industries.
Again, and in contrast to Kadyrzhanova and Rhodes-Kropf (2007) , our results indicate that corporate governance increases company value in non-competitive industries only where the disciplining effect of the product market is presumably weak.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 describes the data and construction of variables used in the study. Section 3 presents the results from the main analysis. Section 4 contains robustness tests and Section 5 concludes.
Data and variables
In this section, we first describe the corporate governance data used in this study and how we condense this data into the governance index employed in the empirical analysis. We also describe our measure of product market competition and the financial variables used in the study.
Firm-level data on corporate governance attributes
We use data on firm-level corporate governance attributes provided by Governance Metrics International (GMI), which started providing governance data in 2003. GMI constructs a governance rating for firms they cover using a proprietary scoring algorithm. To construct these ratings (which we do not use in this paper), GMI assembles information on individual governance attributes. We use these individual governance attributes for the construc- We use a sample of 64 governance attributes that have been gathered by GMI. For each of these attributes, GMI assesses if a firm attains a minimum level of implementation and accordingly codes each attribute with a one if it is in place (indicating good corporate governance) and a zero otherwise. The 64 attributes we consider are sub-categorized by GMI into six categories, namely 1) board accountability, 2) financial disclosure and internal control, 3) shareholder rights, 4) remuneration, 5) market for control, and 6) corporate behavior. Table 1 provides an overview of the 64 governance attributes and shows the percentage of firms meeting these criteria according to GMI's thresholds. A comparison of Table 1 with corresponding results from studies using the Institutional Shareholder Services (ISS) database such as, for example, Aggarwal et al. (2009) , shows that the level of implementation of governance attributes is similar for the governance attributes provided by both data providers. Using these 64 governance attributes, we construct our corporate governance index, denoted CGI, by simply calculating as the percentage of attributes a company has adopted (i.e., attributes which have been assigned a value of one). If a company satisfies all 64 (32 out of the 64) attributes, CGI for this company would be equal to 100% (50%). If the GMI database only provides information on 50 out of the 64 attributes on a particular company and all 50 of them are in place, this company's CGI equals 100%. The additive nature of index construction is a common feature in the literature (see, e.g., GIM; Drobetz et al., 2004; Bebchuck and Cohen, 2005; Aggarwal et al., 2009; Bebchuk et al., 2009 ).
Measure of product market competition
We use the Herfindahl-Hirschman index ("HHI") as a measure for product market competition. For each year, we calculate this index by summing up the squared market shares of all firms in a given industry. To compute the HHI, we use all firms that are listed in a country and for which sales data is available on Worldscope. In addition, we include non-listed firms by merging the Worldscope data with data from Bureau van Dijk's Amadeus database, which provides extensive coverage of non-listed firms across Europe. 3 We exclude firm-years where sales are missing or negative. We classify industries according to the first two digits of a firm's four-digit SIC-code. In line with the close trade relationships that EU member countries have among each other, we treat the European Union as one product market (as opposed to treating each of the 14 countries in our sample as isolated and separate markets). We believe that this is the most reasonable way to define the relevant product market for our sample firms. Given that the firms included in the GMI database are the largest firms of each country, it is more reasonable to assume that they are active across the Europe Union instead of only in their country of origin. However, in a robustness check, we will use country-wide product markets as well.
Financial data
We obtain the financial data for the companies included in our sample from Worldscope. We use Tobin's Q as a measure of firm value. We compute Tobin's Q as the sum of total assets less the book value of equity plus the market value of equity, divided by total assets. In the empirical analysis in Section 3, we include several control variables. We control for firm size by using the logarithm of total assets. In accordance with similar studies for the U.S., we also control for firm age. Since Worldscope has only very sparse coverage of firm age, we construct a proxy for firm age by calculating the number of months since a company's stock started trading. In a robustness test, we additionally include the percentage of closely held shares, defined as the percentage of a company's shares owned by large blockholders with equity stakes in excess of 5% of the company's equity, which we also obtain from Worldscope.
Empirical analysis
We investigate the relationship between corporate governance and firm value across industries with different degrees of product market competition based on a number of alternative empirical setups. Our main approach is similar to the one used by GM. They build terciles of the empirical distribution of all HHIs and assign a dummy variable to each firm-year observation according to whether a firm is in the tercile with the lowest HHI, the medium HHI, or the highest HHI. Based on the results in Petersen (2009), we do not estimate FamaMacBeth regressions as in GIM and GM. Instead, we use pooled fixed effects regressions with standard errors that are clustered at the country level. To control for unobservable heterogeneity that is constant over industry, countries and years, we use industry, country, and year-fixed effects. 4 We thus estimate the following regression specification:
where Q it is Tobin's Q of firm i in year t, α j, α t , and α c are industry-, year-, and country-fixed effects, CGI it is the governance index, I it is a (3x1) vector of HHI dummies and X it is the set of control variables. The elements of X include the logarithm of total assets and the logarithm of firm age. Following GM, we also include the HHI dummies to control for direct effects of competition. Moreover, we interact each control variable with the HHI dummies to control for different effects that the control variables can have in different HHI terciles (for space reasons we do not report the respective coefficients).
We first investigate the average effect of corporate governance on firm value across all industries and hence exclude vector I it and its interaction with CGI it as well as its interaction with X it from the regression equation. The results are reported in Column 1 of Table 2 . As expected, the coefficient on CGI, our governance index, is positive, indicating an overall posi-tive effect of better governance on firm value. The coefficient, however, is statistically (borderline) insignificant. In Column 2, we allow the effect of governance on firm value to vary in the competitiveness of a company's industry by including interaction terms between the HHI tercile dummy variables and the governance index. The results show that the effect of governance is positive across all three terciles but significant only in the highest tercile of the HHI distribution. Hence, consistent with the hypothesis that competitive pressure enforces discipline on managers to maximize firm value and consequently product market competition acts as a substitute for corporate governance, this result shows that corporate governance significantly increases firm value in non-competitive industries only.
One possible concern with our analysis so far is that our classification of industry competitiveness based on GM is ad-hoc and hence that our results could be driven by the way we have divided industries into terciles. In Columns 3 and 4, we address this concern by considering alternative approaches to differentiate between competitive and non-competitive industries. In Column 3, we construct only two sub-samples of industries based on whether the HHI is above or below the median HHI. Again we find the effect of governance on firm value to be much stronger and (borderline) significant in non-competitive industries as compared to competitive industries where it is insignificant. Even if we further break down the classification scheme and build quartiles instead of terciles from the empirical HHI distribution, the result that governance is significantly related to firm value only in firms operating in non-competitive industries (whose HHI is in the top quartile of the empirical HHI distribution) holds (Column 4).
In untabulated robustness tests, we have applied further ways to divide our sample into competitive and non-competitive firm-years. For example, if we build HHI quintiles, the positive and significant effect of governance is divided among the top two quintiles. Hence, our results do not seem to be sensitive with respect to how we classify competitive and non-competitive industries. As a further robustness test, we alternatively calculate our HHI-based measure of competition using the firms' total assets instead of sales. The results are reported in Columns 5 to 7 of Table 2 . Consistent with the results in Columns 2 to 4, we find the relation between corporate governance and firm value to be stronger (and significant) in noncompetitive industries (with the exception of Column 6 where we use the median-based classification).
In Tables 3 and 4 , we perform a number of further robustness tests. First, we follow Kadyrzhanova and Rhodes-Kropf (2007) and perform regressions of Tobin's Q on our governance index, the HHI, a term interacting the governance index and the HHI, and the two control variables. For our hypothesis that governance matters more in non-competitive industries to be validated, we would expect a positive coefficient on the interaction term. The results in Column 1 of Table 3 in Columns 5 and 6 on total assets. Again, the results confirm our main finding from Table 2 .
The valuation effect of corporate governance is smaller for firms operating in competitive industries than for firms in non-competitive industries, even though we note that for the HHI based on sales, the valuation effect of corporate governance is significant in both sub-samples (but somewhat larger for non-competitive firms).
In a further robustness check, we use the yearly empirical distribution of the HHIs to classify firm-years into competitive and non-competitive industries instead of pooling all firm-year observations. The results are reported in Columns 1 to 3 of Table 4 and turn out to remain qualitatively (and quantitatively) unchanged to this variation in the definition of industry dummy variables -independently of whether we use tercile-, median-, or quartile-based dummies. In Columns 4 to 6 of Table 4 , we use different data to compute the HHIs. Instead of using the whole universe of listed and unlisted companies, we compute the HHIs only based on listed companies as often done in prior research (e.g., Mueller, 2008, 2009 ).
Again we find the results to remain virtually unchanged as compared to the specifications in Table 2 or Columns 1 to 3 in Table 4 .
As a further robustness check, we reestimate our analyses for an extended sample including six additional (non-EU) countries, namely Canada, Australia, Japan, Hong Kong, Singapore, and New Zealand. This sample extension has a significant drawback. Instead of using the multinational EU-area product market, we have to assume that product markets are purely domestic and not affected by competition from companies located in other countries.
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The results from this analysis are reported in Table 5 . Regardless of whether we use the approach of Kadyrzhanova and Rhodes-Kropf (2007) (Columns 1 to 3), GM's approach based on terciles (Column 4), or GM's approach based on medians or quartiles (Columns 5 and 6), the results are very similar to those obtained for the EU-based sample. The most important differences with respect to Tables 2 and 3 are that the positive effect of governance is observable not only in the tercile with the lowest competition but also in the middle tercile (Column 4) as well as in the two low-competition quartiles instead of only the quartile with the lowest competition (Column 6).
We perform two additional robustness checks which are not reported for space reasons. First, we construct an alternative version of the governance index and exclude attributes 5 While this assumption is standard in the literature on the relation between product market competition and corporate governance (e.g., Kadyrzhanova and Rhodes-Kropf, 2007; Giroud and Mueller, 2008; Cremers et al., 2008) , it is probably less problematic for the U.S. as compared to the strongly connected EU-markets.
that are in place at more than 90 or less than 10 percent of the sample firms. We thereby attempt to account for the fact that certain governance attributes are adopted by a very large percentage of sample firms and other attributes by almost none (see Table 1 ). These corporate governance attributes naturally will have a very low variance and potentially weaken the effect of our corporate governance indices. However, all of our results remain qualitatively unchanged when we replace CGI by this alternative governance index. Second, we include the percentage of closely held shares as an additional control variable. For European firms, where a controlling shareholder is much more common than in the U.S., the positive effects of governance could be influenced by the existence of a large and controlling shareholder. However, the inclusion of this additional control variable, which is usually positive but insignificant in most specifications, does not qualitatively change any of our results.
Conclusions
In this paper, we present new evidence on the influence of product market competition on the valuation effect of corporate governance. Recent U.S. evidence is inconclusive. On the one hand, there is evidence that firms in less competitive industries benefit more from good corporate governance than firms in more competitive industries and, hence, a competitive product market acts as a substitute for an efficient corporate governance structure (e.g., Mueller, 2008, 2009 ). On the other hand, there is evidence that corporate governance matters more in competitive industries (Kadyrzhanova and Rhodes-Kropf, 2007 Our results suggest that corporate governance is significantly positively related to firm value in non-competitive industries only. Hence, our findings are consistent with the hypothesis that product market competition acts as a substitute for corporate governance as competitive pressure enforces discipline on managers to maximize firm value. This result is robust to a large number of robustness checks including alternative ways to classify observations into competitive and non-competitive firm-years, an alternative corporate governance index, extending our sample to include six non-EU countries, which roughly doubles sample size, and estimating alternative regressions specifications. The table reports the results from panel regressions of Tobin's Q on HHI dummies, the governance index, two control variables, and interaction terms between the HHI dummies and the governance index and between the HHI dummies and the control variables. All regressions include year-, industry-, and country-fixed effects. The governance index is built additively from the 64 governance attributes described in Table 1 . The HHI dummies indicate whether the HHI is in the highest, middle, or lowest tercile of its empirical distribution (Column 2 and 5), whether the HHI is above or below the median HHI (Columns 3 and 6), or whether the HHI is in the first, second, third, or fourth quartile (Columns 4 and 7). In Columns 2 to 4, the HHIs are based on the distribution of company sales and in Columns 5 to 7, the HHIs are based on the distribution of company total assets within the respective industry. In Columns 2 to 7, the intercept, the governance index, and the control variables are interacted with the HHI dummies. For space reasons only the interaction terms between the governance index and the HHI dummies are reported. All industries are defined by 2-digit-SIC codes. The control variables are firm size, proxied by the logarithm of total assets (LNTA), and the log of a firm's age, proxied by the time since the beginning of trading (LNAGE). The sample period is from 2003 to 2007. t-statistics are in parentheses and allow for clustering at the country level. *,**, and *** denotes statistical significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% level, respectively. The table reports the results from panel regressions of Tobin's Q on the governance index, two control variables, and year-, industry-, and country-fixed effects. Columns 1 and 2 additionally include the HHI and an interaction term between the governance index and HHI. The governance index is built additively from the 64 governance attributes described in Table 1 . In Columns 1, 5, and 6, the HHIs are based on the distribution of company sales, in Columns 2, 3, and 4, the HHIs are based on the distribution of company total assets within the respective industry. In Columns 3 to 6, the sample is split into sub-samples according to whether a company's HHI is below (= high competition) or above (= low competition) the median HHI. All industries are defined by 2-digit-SIC codes. The control variables are firm size, proxied by the logarithm of total assets (LNTA), and the log of a firm's age, proxied by the time since the beginning of trading (LNAGE). The sample period is from 2003 to 2007. t-statistics are in parentheses and allow for clustering at the country level. *,**, and *** denotes statistical significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% level, respectively. The table reports the results from panel regressions of Tobin's Q on HHI dummies, two control variables, and interaction terms between the HHI dummies and the governance index and between the HHI dummies and the control variables. All regressions include year-, industry-, and country-fixed effects. The constant, the governance index, and the control variables are interacted with the HHI dummies. For space reasons only the interaction terms between the governance index and the HHI dummies are reported. The governance index is built additively from the 64 governance attributes described in Table 1 . The HHI dummies indicate whether the HHI is in the highest, middle, or lowest tercile of its empirical distribution (Column 1 and 4), whether the HHI is above or below the median (Columns 2 and 5), or whether the HHI is in the first, second, third, or fourth quartile (Columns 3 and 6). In Columns 1 to 3, the empirical HHI distribution is computed every year. In Columns 4 to 6, the HHI are based on listed companies only. All HHIs are based on the distribution of company sales within the respective industry. All industries are defined by 2-digit-SIC codes. The control variables are firm size, proxied by the logarithm of total assets (LNTA), and the log of a firm's age, proxied by the time since the beginning of trading (LNAGE). The sample period is from 2003 to 2007. t-statistics are in parentheses and allow for clustering at the country level. *,**, and *** denotes statistical significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% level, respectively. 
